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1 Introduction
Social networks representing the pattern of social interactions - who talks
to or who observes whom- play a crucial role as a medium for the spread
of information, ideas, diseases, products. Someone in the population may
be struck with an infection or may adopt a new technology, and it can then
either die out quickly or spread throughout the population, depending pos-
sibly on the location of the initial appearance, the structure of the network
- for instance, how dense it is. The dynamics of adoption -the extent to
which individuals are influenced by their neighbours, the impact of “word-
of- mouth” communication- also plays a role in determining the speed of
diffusion. Given the large range of contexts in which social learning is im-
portant, it is not surprising that researchers from various disciplines have
studied processes of diffusion from a variety of perspectives.1
For instance, the classic study of [3] describes the impact of the social
structure on the prescription of a new drug by doctors. [8], [18] are amongst
several papers that focus on social learning and the adoption of new tech-
nologies in agriculture in developing countries. Of greater relevance to the
present paper is the use of social networks to promote new products through
“word-of-mouth” communication and viral marketing.2 The growing popu-
larity of this form of advertising has resulted in a corresponding increase in
the attention this has received both in the academic marketing literature as
well as in the more popular media.
A particularly interesting form of word-of-mouth marketing, described
in a New York Times magazine article by Rob Walker on December 5,
2004, provides the main motivation for this paper. Writing about how
“word of mouth” marketing was superseding more traditional modes with
fracturing market segments, he wrote about the “growing number of mar-
keters organizing veritable armies of hired “trendsetters” or “influencers”
or “street teams” to execute “seeding programs,”, “viral marketing,” “guer-
rilla marketing” ” as “attempts to break the ...wall that used to separate
the theater of commerce, persuasion and salesmanship from our actual day-
to-day life.” For example, the acquaintance who recommends a book to
someone might actually not have read it but have been provided talking
points by a paid agent of the publisher. With the advent of web-based
social networking sites, viral marketing has taken on added importance.
See, for example, http://techcrunch.com/2008/04/21/facebook-publishes-
1See [15] for an account of recent research on diffusion.
2See [17], [14].
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insiders-guide-to-viral-marketing/, where several techniques are discussed
including using the “News Feed” feature to convey information to friends of
users and their friends and so on. In a somewhat different context, a gov-
ernment body hoping to spread a new technology might solicit important
and connected individuals, in the focal community to recommend the new
methods to people they know.
It might well be known to the target segment of consumers that this
type of activity is going on (especially after the appearance of the New York
Times article!); this might lead to such recommendations from neighbors
being received with some scepticism and possibly ignored. In such cases,
even a good product and a good new technology might not diffuse as fast
as it should or even diffuse at all, thus leading to a socially undesirable
outcome.
The problems discussed in the preceding paragraphs have two important
distinguishing features from those studied in the basic models of the spread
of disease in epidemiology, namely:
1. Interactions among individuals take place in an explicit network
structure-individual j might not be at risk of contracting an infection from
individual i, if i and j are not “neighbours” in some sense. Thus there
is some network microstructure to consider, which the differential equation
models of diffusion or infection ignore.
2. Whilst an individual i might have no choice as to whether he or she
contracts a viral infection from the person coughing in the next seat on a
trans-Atlantic flight, he or she does have a choice as to whether she buys
a particular set of noise-cancelling headphones because she sees this person
using it (or recommending it to her). There is thus a strategic informa-
tional element, (the person in the next seat might have a special interest
propagating these headphones) that seems central to any analysis. 3
Tracking how these two elements interact is the main aim of this paper.
We consider a fixed network, given exogenously as in the motivational ex-
amples above. This contrasts with some recent work (see Goyal and Vigier
([11]), in which the question considered is the design of a robust network. In
our context, such a “robust network” might be designed to limit the spread
of bad information for example.
We consider a finite number of potential buyers who are connected in
a fixed network. There is a seller who can choose to “seed” the network
3There are some papers that consider the first aspect but not the second. See, for
instance, the textbook treatment by Draief and Massoulie [4], and the survey by Jackson
and Yariv [12].
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by paying an agent at any given node in the network to give a positive
recommendation about the seller’s product. The seller knows in advance
whether his product is of good or bad quality. Buyers have ex ante beliefs
about whether the product is good. Buyers are of two types. There is some
probability that a buyer at a given node is an “innovator”, who will try the
new product immediately; with the complementary probability a buyer is
normal in that she makes a rational decision on whether to buy or not. We
assume (to avoid trivialities) that the ex ante belief is below the threshold
required to induce the second type of buyers to purchase the product.
Buyers can also recommend buying the product to their neighbors in
the network. We can also think of this as individuals using the product
frequently, so they are observed to do so by their neighbours. Buyers who
are not innovators and who receive recommendations from their neighbors
have to form posterior beliefs about the quality of the product, and then
decide whether to buy the product. Each purchase gives the seller a unit
profit (prices are assumed to be fixed) and future payoffs are discounted; so
if buying is optimal, buying now is better than waiting.
We model this process as a game of incomplete information and focus
on the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game. Our principal interest is in
studying the conditions under which the product of good quality will diffuse
with probability one throughout the network in the fastest possible time -
we call this the efficient diffusion equilibrium (EDE). In particular, what are
the types of network structures which are conducive to the existence of an
EDE?
In order to answer this question, we have to analyze the optimal market-
ing strategies of the two types of firms. This is related to a popular theme in
the existing marketing literature. This literature suggests that it is optimal
to initially target a few “influential” members of the population since these
influential members can then more easily convince others in the network
to buy the product.4 A “naive” view is that highly connected individuals
are more likely to be influential. However, [9] provides a more nuanced
and interesting analysis by showing that “the optimality of targeting highly
connected nodes depends very much on the content of social interaction.”
Our analysis shows that the two types of firms will follow very different
targeting strategies in equilibrium. A firm which produces a good quality
product will want to buy off an agent which can reach out to all other
agents in the shortest possible time. On the other hand, a firm producing
4This has given rise to the development of algorithms to locate the most influential
members in a network. See [16] and [13].
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a bad quality product is more myopic because it knows that its product
will not sell beyond one period since no one other than the agent it has
bought off will recommend the product. So, this firm will want to place its
implant at nodes which have the highest number of connections. However,
the bad quality firm must also ensure that its agent’s recommendation is
credible. For instance, if consumers know that the bad quality firm buys off
a particular agent with probability one, then that agent’s recommendation
is less likely to be credible.
The optimal behavior of the two types of firm determine whether an
EDE exists or not. Our analysis reveals some counter-intuitive results. For
example, it turns out that if any individual is “too influential” in the sense
of being connected to everyone, then an EDE cannot exist. This is because
both types of firms would target such an individual, thereby destroying
the credibility of her recommendation. Of course, efficient diffusion would
typically be guaranteed in contexts where the credibility of recommendations
is not at stake. This is one point in which the strategic element in the
problem has bite. It also turns out for somewhat subtler reasons that larger
(in a sense to be described later) networks are more likely to support efficient
diffusion.
We provide a partial characterization of networks which support EDEs.
We also have some “comparative statics” results. In particular, we focus
on the role of the network structure, as well as on the probability that
consumers are innovators. Of course, there can be other types of inefficient
equilibria and we illustrate the nature of these equilibria for the special case
where the network is a line. We also briefly discuss the robustness of our
results if the model is changed to allow for innovators to make negative
recommendations. Obviously, the possibility of negative recommendations
will lower the expected profits from employing an “implant” for the bad
quality firm, and thus make the existence of an EDE more likely. However,
conditional on the bad quality firm employing an implant, there is very little
qualitative change in our results.
Our model has one strong assumption. We assume that the structure of
the network is common knowledge. A model where there is partial knowledge
about the network (in addition to the strategic element) is left for future
research.
1.1 Related literature
There has been a voluminous literature on diffusion of innovation arising
from different causes; for a game-theoretic analysis on how these different
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causes could lead to different observed patterns of diffusion, see Peyton
Young [20]. However, Young does not explicitly consider a network struc-
ture.
The paper that considers the most closely related problem of a monop-
olist “seeding” a network in order to spread information about his product
is [9]. This paper considers a monopolist who can choose a fraction x of
the population (modelled as the unit interval [0,1]) at a cost of c(x)). Each
individual picks a finite number of neighbors from the unit interval, so the
neighbors of different individuals are in independent subsets (the probabil-
ity of a common neighbour is 0). The number of neighbors varies according
to a probability distribution; each individual can get information about the
product either directly from the monopolist or indirectly from one of her
neighbors, who is himself directly informed. The results obtained are es-
sentially about properties of the degree distribution that facilitate spread of
the monopolist’s information.
Unlike our work, Galeotti and Goyal do not consider a seller with private
information or Bayesian buyers who take into account how their current
state of information reveals what is happening in unobserved parts of the
network. Our results relate primarily to different notions of centrality in a
given network structure, rather than to the average degree or the variance
of the degree distribution as in Galeotti and Goyal.
Our work is also related to social learning in networks, as in [1], [2].5
The main difference between our work and these papers is that we have a
strategic seller who has private information about quality and is trying to
manipulate the diffusion, whilst none of the other papers do. Also our buyers
are fully rational Bayesians; even [1] do not model buyers who infer events
in unobserved parts of the network, as our buyers do. It is not surprising
therefore that our equilibria are quite different.
The next section describes the formal model. We then illustrate the
workings of our model when the network structure is a line. This is followed
by a partial characterization result on the type of networks which sustain
an EDE. Our comparative statics results are contained in the subsequent
section. The following sections describe the nature of inefficient equilibria
on the line and extensions to the basic model.
5See [10] for an illuminating survey of papers on learning in networks. Other related
papers are[5], [6], [7].
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2 The model
In this section, we describe the basic model. The set N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
represents the set of consumers. The structure of interactions between the
set of consumers is represented by means of a graph Γ in which the nodes
are elements of N and ij ∈ Γ if consumers i and j can communicate with
each other. There is a firm F, which is interested in selling its product. The
product is either of type G(ood) or B(ad). Firm F knows the type of its
product.
All buyers have an initial probability p that the product is of the good
type. There are two types of consumers. Buyers of the first type - we refer
to them as the innovators- get utility g′ from the G product and utility −b′
from the B product. These numbers are such that it is a dominant strategy
for innovators to buy immediately. On the other hand, the second type
of buyers (the normal types) get utilities g and b from the G and B type
products. Thus, if
p < p¯ ≡ b
b+ g
the second type of consumer will not buy the good unless she revises her
probability belief about the good in subsequent periods. If p = p¯, she will be
indifferent between buying and not buying the good if she does not expect to
receive any further information about the product if she does not buy. Since
there are a finite number of agents, there must be a time period in which
this is so (take the maximum distance from a node to any other node and
suppose that information, if transmitted takes a number of periods equal
to the distance to traverse the path). If future information is expected, in
general a buyer i is indifferent between buying and not buying in period t
for p = p¯ti, where p¯
t
i could depend on the time period t, the position of the
agent and the strategies of the good and bad types and is in general strictly
greater than p¯. When t = 1, we will typically write p¯i instead of p¯ti. We
illustrate the dependence of p¯ti on these factors when the network is a line
in Section 3.
Each consumer buys the product at most once. The firm gets 1 unit
for each item purchased and 0 if an item is not purchased. There are no
capacity constraints on the number of items sold.
Future payoffs are discounted by δ for F and for the consumers.
The time line: Nature draws the type of F and this is revealed only
to F. F chooses a site i to place one “implant” at a “small” cost c or
decides not to use any implants. The implant, if any, is paid to pass on a
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recommendation to his neighbors in Γ. If i is not an implant, she can be
an “innovator” in which case she tries the new product immediately. The
probability that any site i is an innovator is ρ < 1 and the event that “i is an
innovator” is independent of other events “j 6= i is an innovator”. All this
takes place, in sequence, at t = 0. At t = 1, any i who is an innovator, and
who has obtained a utility of g′, makes a recommendation to his neighbors.
An implant always makes a recommendation, but may choose the time at
which she makes the recommendation for strategic reasons. The neighbors
receiving the recommendation might choose to buy the product or not to
buy it. At t = τ, any site who is either an implant or has tried the product
and found it good, after receiving a recommendation in τ − 1, can make
a recommendation to neighbors. A site i does not observe if neighbors
have received recommendations or have chosen to buy the product- she only
observes whether recommendations are made by the neighbors themselves.
There is no exogenous time limit on the game; however, since there are
a finite number of neighbors and each speaks at most once, the game must
end in finite time.
Updating Beliefs
Let α and β be the mixed equilibrium strategies of types G and B re-
spectively. That is, αi is the probability with which type G uses consumer
i as an implant. Suppose consumer i receives a recommendation from her
neighbor i − 1 in period 1. If she receives no other recommendation, what
is the probability that the product is G? Let us denote this by η1i,i−1, where
the superscript refers to the time the recommendation is received and the
subscripts to the recipient and the sender of the recommendation.
Let Ni(Γ) = {j ∈ N |ij ∈ Γ} denote the set of neighbors of i, and
di(Γ) = |Ni(Γ)| be the degree of i in Γ. (Henceforth, whenever there is no
ambiguity about Γ, we will simply write di, dj , etc.)
Since the derivation of the probability η1i,i−1 is somewhat tedious to
check, we reproduce the actual calculation. The probability required is:
Prob. [product is G| i is not an implant or innovator and none of the other
neighbours other than i−1 has made a recommendation and i−1 has made
a recommendation]
Let’s call the conditioned event A and the conditioning event B.
Then, by Bayes’ Theorem, P(A | B) = P (B | A)P (A)/[P (B | A)P (A) +
P (B | AC)P (AC)].
= P (A and B)
P (A and B)+P (AC and B)
The numerator is then p(1− αi)(1− ρ)di−1[ αi−11−αi + ρ(1−
Σj∈Niαj
1−αi )]
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=p(1 − ρ)di−1[αi−1 + ρ(1 − Σj∈Ni∪iαj)] for αi 6= 1. (We can take limits
if αi = 1)
The denominator is this quantity plus another term P (B | AC)P (AC)].
This is the probability of all this happening if the product is a bad one.
The second term in the denominator is therefore (1 − p)(1 − βi) βi−11−βi again
assuming βi < 1. Hence,
η1i,i−1 =
p(1− ρ)di−1
[
αi−1 + (1−
∑
j∈Ni αj − αi)ρ
]
p(1− ρ)di−1
[
αi−1 + (1−
∑
j∈Ni αj − αi)ρ
]
+ (1− p)βi−1
(1)
Some “special” cases illustrate the nature of the updating process. Sup-
pose that the type G firm uses a pure strategy so that for some site m,
αm = 1. Suppose i is a neighbor of m, but receives only one recommenda-
tion from some j 6= m. Then, i must conclude that j is a bad implant - if
the product had been good, then there would have been a good implant at
m who would then have passed on a recommendation to her. This argument
generalizes even when the type G firm uses a strategy whose support is some
set M containing more than one node. Suppose now that i is a common
neighbor of all nodes in M . Again, if i does not receive a recommendation
from some member of M , she will conclude that any other recommendation
comes from a bad implant. Next, suppose again that αm = 1 and that m
receives a recommendation from some neighbor. Of course, such recommen-
dations are not credible to m - she would have been used as an implant by
the type G form if the product was good. These inferences are confirmed
by equation (1) - in all cases, the numerator is 0.
Of course, if i receives a recommendation from two or more neighbors,
then i concludes that the product is G with probability one- if there is a
bad implant at j, then there cannot be a bad implant at j′ 6= j.
Suppose next that i receives a recommendation from i−1 in some period
t > 1, but no recommendation from any other neighbor. If i has not received
any recommendations before period t and receives one from i− 1 in period
t, this can happen because the product is Bad, there is an implant at i− 1
and the implant chooses to speak at period t. Alternatively, the product
is Good, i − 1 heard a recommendation from one of her neighbors in the
previous period, but none of i’s other neighbors received a recommendation
from any of their neighbors in period t− 1. Explicit computations of these
probabilities are hard to describe since these depend on the structure of the
network. But, notice that some recommendations are easy to dismiss. For
instance, suppose Γ is a line, and let i be an extreme point of Γ, with degree
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one. Then, any recommendation from i coming in period t > 1 is not taken
seriously by i’s neighbor since i could not have received a recommendation
in period t− 1.
Efficient Diffusion Equilibrium
Consider an environment in which Firm G is the only type of firm, so
that the issue of credibility of recommendations does not arise. For instance,
consumers may be initially unaware about the existence of the product, but
are willing to buy the product after receiving a recommendation. Then, Firm
G will want to “seed” the network by using implant(s). In the absence of any
issue of credibility of recommendations, the product will diffuse throughout
the network with probability one if an implant is used. Since the firm
discounts the future, it will want to place its implant so as to maximize
the speed of diffusion. The optimal site(s) for a Good implant is related to
a measure of centrality of network structures. Let dij denote the geodesic
distance between i and j in the graph Γ. That is, dij is the length of the
shortest path between i and j.
Definition 1. A node i maximizes decay centrality in a graph Γ if
∑
j 6=i δ
d(i,j) ≥∑
j 6=k δ
d(k,j) for all k ∈ N .
Let D(Γ) denote the set of nodes maximizing decay centrality. While it
is not easy to compute this set in general graphs, the set is easily identified
in special cases. For instance, if Γ is a line, then the median(s) must be
maximizing decay centrality. Or if Γ is a star, then the hub (that is a node
with degree n− 1) is obviously the node maximizing decay centrality.
Notice that since consumers also discount the future, consumers’ surplus
is also maximized when the G-implant is placed at a node which maximizes
decay centrality.
Henceforth, we are particularly interested in a PBE which we will re-
fer to as the efficient diffusion equilibrium (EDE). An EDE will have two
properties -(i) the good product will diffuse throughout the network with
probability one, and (ii) the good implant is placed at some node maximizing
decay centrality.
So, if (α, β) denote the probability distributions with which the G-type
and B-type implants are placed at different nodes, then the support of α
must be contained in the set D(Γ). Moreover, there must be at least one
sequence of recommendations originating from all nodes with αi > 0 which
are accepted with probability one- otherwise the good product will not dif-
fuse through the entire network with probability one. Hence, conditional on
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the product being Good, an EDE thus maximizes consumer surplus.6
Of course, we also need to identify when G and B will decide to use an
implant. This must depend on a comparison of the increase in expected
profit resulting from an implant and the cost c incurred by employing an
implant. We assume that c > 0 and is in the range which makes it profitable
for both types to employ just one implant.
3 An Example
In this section, we provide an informal discussion of a specific network struc-
ture, - the line when n is odd, in order to illustrate the conditions required
for an efficient diffusion equilibrium.
So, let Γ be a line, with the sites ordered so that 1 and n are the end-
points of the line having degree one, while all other sites have degree 2. Since
n is odd, the unique median maximizes decay centrality. Hence, in any PBE
(α, β), where α and β denote the equilibrium strategies of the Good and
Bad types respectively, αm = 1. Now, if this PBE is to be an EDE, then the
recommendation coming from m has to be accepted with probability one.
That is, m− 1 and m+ 1 must accept any recommendation coming from m
with probability one. Since the bad type can always mimic the Good type,
this implies that wherever the bad implant is placed, her recommendation
must be accepted by two neighbors.
But, of course, βm 6= 1. For, if βm = 1, then from equation (1),
η1m−1,m = η1m+1,m = p and neither of m’s neighbors would buy the product
after receiving a recommendation from m- which is a contradiction. So,
while the support of β can include m, it cannot coincide with {m}. Over
what set of nodes can the bad type “distribute” β? The answer of course is
that the support of β must be contained in those nodes who can make “credi-
ble” recommendations to both their neighbours, since m’s recommendations
are credible. This must be the set
S ≡ N \ {1,m− 2,m− 1,m+ 1,m+ 2, n}
It is clear that 1 and n cannot be in S since they have only one neighbor.
Although m − 2 and m + 2 have degree 2, notice that m − 1 (respectively
m + 1) will not believe a single recommendation from m − 2 (respectively
6If the product is Bad, the upper bound on the extent of diffusion is given by the
maximal degree of any node in the network.
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from m + 2).7 Of course, m − 1 and m + 1 cannot sell to m. Also, notice
that if n < 9, then m will be the sole member of S, and there will not be
any EDE.
It is also clear when the bad type will want to use an implant when there
is an EDE. Let the implant be placed at i. Since i can be an innovator with
probability ρ (in which case he would buy the product anyway), the effective
cost of an implant at i is
ρ+ c
The benefit is the additional probability that i−1 and i+1 buy the product.
With probability (1−ρ)2, neither is an innovator. With probability 2(1−ρ)ρ,
one of the two is an innovator. Hence, the benefit is
2(1− ρ)2δ + 2(1− ρ)ρδ = 2δ(1− ρ)
So,the net gain of an implant for B is given by
2δ(1− ρ)− ρ− c
where c is the cost of an implant. So, B will use an implant if
c ≤ cB(δ, ρ) ≡ 2δ(1− ρ)− ρ
Not surprisingly, the higher the value of ρ, the lower is the expected gain
from employing an implant.
Consider G. Let piG(δ, ρ) denote the profit of G in the absence of an
implant, and p¯iG(δ, ρ) denote the profit of G if an implant is used.8
Then, G will use an implant if
c ≤ cG(δ, ρ) ≡ p¯iG(δ, ρ)− piG(δ, ρ)
The expected profits of G with or without an implant increases in ρ. How-
ever, notice that the difference between the two levels of profit decreases as
δ → 1 since the speed of diffusion is less important as δ increases. In the
limit,
lim
δ→1
(p¯iG(δ, ρ)− piG(δ, ρ)) = n− 1− n[1− (1− ρ)n]
On the other hand, an increase in δ increases the value of an implant to B.
So, for “high” δ, it may well be the case that only the bad type uses an
implant!
7Both m− 1 and m+ 1 know that if the product is good, then m would have made a
recommendation.
8These expressions are difficult to compute for general n.
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Let cm = min
(
cB(δ, ρ), cG(δ, ρ)
)
.
Suppose βi > 0 for some i. It is easy to place an upper bound on how
high βi can be in equilibrium. Since i’s recommendation must be accepted
with probability one by both her neighbors, their updated probability that
the product is good cannot fall below p¯i−1 or p¯i+1. Note that for m− 1 and
m+1, p¯m−1 = p¯m+1 = p¯0. Equation 1 and the fact that αm = 1 now readily
yield these upper bounds.
β¯m =
p(1− p¯0)
p¯0(1− p) , and for i 6= m, β¯i =
ρp
1− p min
[
(1− p¯i−1)
p¯i−1
,
(1− p¯i+1)
p¯i+1
]
It is now easy to describe what an EDE looks like when n ≥ 9 is odd,
and the cost of an implant does not exceed cm.
(i) The type G firm puts its implant at the median of the line with
probability one.
(ii) The support of β is contained in S, and for each i in the support of
β, βi ≤ β¯i, βm ≤ β¯m and βi = 0 elsewhere.
(iii) The implant (irrespective of type) “speaks” in period 1.
(iv) Recommendations received from each site in the support of β are
accepted with probability one in period 1.
(v) In subsequent periods t > 1, a site i < m accepts a recommendation
from i + 1 with probability one if the equilibrium response of i + 1 was to
accept the recommendation from i+2 in period t−1. Similarly, a site i > m
accepts a recommendation from i−1 if the equilibrium response of i−1 was
to accept the recommendation from i− 2 in period t− 1.
As we have mentioned before, Property (ii) follows from the fact that
recommendations will not be accepted unless the updated belief that the
product is good reaches the threshold value of p¯. Property (iv) is consistent
with this since a site that receives a recommendation (and is not an innovator
or an implant) is at least indifferent between buying and not buying and
strictly prefers buying if the inequality is strict.
For property (iii), note that if the product is bad, then the implant can
only hope to persuade two neighbors to buy the product - her recommen-
dation will not be passed on. If the product is good, then the product will
diffuse through the entire population given (v). Since an implant’s recom-
mendation is accepted with probability one by both neighbors, the implant
gets the same outcome as early as possible in either case.
Property (i) follows by noting that type G cannot be indifferent between
m and any other site. At m, the implant will obtain an expected payoff of
δ.2+δ2.2+.... form−1 terms. Atm−k, say, the payoff will be δ.2+δ2.2+...δt2
for m− k− 1 terms and δm−k.1 + .. for an additional 2k terms, thus taking
12
m + k − 1 periods to diffuse completely rather than m − 1 periods, if the
good implant locates at m.9 Thus the speed of diffusion is higher by locating
at m, since there are two new buyers in each period for every period the
diffusion continues, whilst at m−k, there is only one buyer for every period
after k − 1.
The argument for (v) includes the following: Since the B implant speaks
in period 1 in equilibrium, any recommendation after period 1 must come
from a relayed recommendation from an innovator or a good implant at
some i 6= m or m respectively. If t ≥ m− 1, no recommendation will occur
along the equilibrium path but it is assumed that off-equilibrium beliefs also
induce acceptance of the recommendation.
We note that the B implant will not deviate to speaking after m−1, even
with this belief, because of discounting and the acceptance probabilities of
1 even if B speaks early.
Remark 1. We note again that | S | must be large enough for the B implant
to put “small amounts” of probability at each site in S in his randomization.
For example, if | S | is very small so that there is no distribution that makes
it possible for βi ≤ β¯i for all sites in S and βm ≤ β¯m, then this equilibrium
will not exist. On the other hand, notice that if a smaller “line” supports an
EDE, then so must a larger line. In other words, efficient diffusion is more
likely the larger the number of potential customers!
Remark 2. An explicit characterisation of p¯ti is tedious, but it is easy to see
how it can be done. Suppose αm = 1 as above. Suppose site i is located at
such a distance to the left of m that a message from m will arrive in period
T. At period T−1, suppose i receives a recommendation from a neighbour on
his left, which could have been relayed from an innovator T − 1 steps to i′s
left. For what value of p would i accept this recommendation? If he waits for
one more period, he will receive perfect information, either a message from
his right neighbour, which will make p = 1 or no message, which will imply
p = 0. His expected utility from waiting if his current belief that the product is
good is pT−1, is therefore δpT−1g. If he buys now, he will get pT−1(g+b)−b.
The value of p¯T−1i is therefore
b
b+(1−δ)g . If δ = 0, this is exactly p¯; if δ is
close to 1, this quantity is also close to 1. One can similarly calculate p¯T−2i
at T −2 by comparing the utility of buying now versus waiting one period for
imperfect information and two periods for perfect information, and so on.
9This calculation does not take ρ into account, but it is obvious this wouldn’t change
the ranking because sites are independently innovators or non-innovators
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If i gets a recommendation before period T -1 from a neighbour on the path
between him and m, perfect information is ruled out, since each player only
speaks once and i′s neighbour will not pass on any other message from the
right. There is still some probability of imperfect information from the left
(confirmatory if the product is good, none if the product is bad) coming from
an innovator whose message takes the requisite number of periods to reach
i. Once again, a value of p¯ti, which makes i indifferent between buying and
not buying, can be calculated. On the line, both the above possibilities cannot
arise together. In more general networks, one would take the maximum value
of p¯ti calculated for each possible path on which additional information could
travel.
Of course, inefficient equilibria can exist when n is not large enough.
These will typically involve the bad implant delaying his recommendation for
strategic reasons. In such equilibria, recommendations will not be accepted
with probability one. We will get back to this issue in a later section.
4 A Partial Characterization Result
In this section, we describe a sufficient condition for an EDE to exist, and
then show that this condition is necessary for certain types of network struc-
tures.
Say that a link ij ∈ Γ is critical if Γ− ij has more components than Γ.
That is, if a critical link is removed from a connected network Γ, then the
network Γ no longer remains connected. Say that a node i is critical in Γ
if all links of i are critical. Of course, if the network is a tree, then all links
are critical, and so all nodes are critical.
Fix some set M ⊂ N . For any node i 6∈ M , let N¯i(M,Γ) = Ni(Γ) \
(∩j∈MNj(Γ)), where Nj(Γ) is the set of neighbors of j in Γ. Let d¯i(M,Γ) =
|N¯i(M,Γ)|. We will refer to d¯i as the effective degree of a node i /∈M . For
any m ∈ M , let d¯m = dm = |Nm(Γ)|. That is, if i ∈ M , then the effective
degree of i coincides with |Ni(Γ)|.
Suppose α denotes the mixed strategy employed by the type G firm in
any equilibrium. Let M be the support of α. Then N¯i(M,Γ) is the set of
potential neighbors of i who may possibly believe that the product is good
after receiving a single recommendation from i in period 1. To see this,
notice that if the product is good, then a positive recommendation must
come from some member of M . The absence of such a recommendation
signals that any other recommendation comes from a bad implant. So, any
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k who is a common neighbor of all sites in M will find a recommendation
credible only if some member of M sends a recommendation.
In order to simplify the notation, we will simply write N¯i, d¯i whenever
the absence of M and Γ will not cause any confusion.
Given some M ⊂ N , partition nodes into sets S1, . . . , SK such that S1 is
the set of nodes maximizing d¯i, S2 is the set of nodes with the next highest
value of d¯i, and so on.
For every node i, let hi be the site in N¯i which maximizes degree, and
dhi be its degree. Notice that equation 1 implies that for any given value of
βi,
η1hi,i ≤ η1j,i for all j ∈ N¯i
For each j ∈ N¯i, let βji be the value of βi which sets η1j,i = p¯j .
For each i, β¯i ≡ min
j∈N¯i
βji (2)
Remark 3. Notice that each β¯i depends on the vector α via equation 1. We
will not explicitly indicate this dependence in order to simplify the notation.
The next theorem identifies a sufficient condition for a network structure
to support an EDE. It also shows that if all nodes in D(Γ) are critical
and (somewhat loosely speaking) have highest effective degree, then this
condition is also necessary. These conditions are satisfied by the line, and
so this theorem will include the line as a special case.
Theorem 1. Suppose the cost of an implant is sufficiently low for both types
of the firm to use an implant. Then, an EDE exists if there is some α with
support M contained in the set D(Γ) such that∑
i∈S1(M)
β¯i ≥ 1 (3)
Conversely, an EDE does not exist if every m ∈ D(Γ) is critical, for all
M ⊆ D(Γ), M ⊂ S1(M) and equation 3 does not hold.
Proof. Suppose there is α such that equation 3 is satisfied. Let α be the
strategy employed by the good type, and choose β such that
βi ≤ β¯i for all i ∈ S1
and
βi = 0 if i /∈ S1
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The response strategies are straightforward. All sites accept all recommen-
dations in all periods.
It is easy to check that these strategies constitute a PBE. Clearly, the
type G firm has no incentive to deviate since her implant is at some site
maximizing decay centrality and recommendations are accepted with prob-
ability one. Similarly, the type B firm has no incentive to deviate since she
obtains a payoff of d¯1|S1| − c, conditional on no innovators in N¯1. Clearly,
no other site can yield a higher payoff. The response decisions are optimal
because (i) any recommendation coming from a site not in the union of the
supports of α and β must be coming from an innovator, and (ii) the updated
belief of any i after receiving a recommendation from a potential implant is
at least as large as the threshold value p¯.
Consider now the necessity of this condition. First, the type G firm
must be choosing an α with support contained in D(Γ) in any EDE. Fix
any such α and suppose αm > 0. Since m is critical in Γ, all neighbors
of m must accept a recommendation from m with probability one in an
EDE. So, the type B firm by placing her implant at some site where αi > 0
can obtain |S1| “hits”. Hence, in equilibrium, the support of β must be
contained in S1. Moreover, if βi > 0, every member of N¯i(Γ) has to accept
the recommendation of i. Hence, the maximum probability weight that the
type B firm can put on i cannot exceed β¯i. This is not possible if equation
3 does not hold.
Equation 3 is easy to interpret. If there are a sufficient number of nodes
maximizing effective degree, then an EDE is easy to support since the type
B firm has enough “space” to distribute his probability. Why is equation
3 not necessary without additional conditions? Suppose, for simplicity that
αm = 1 for some node in D(Γ), but αm /∈ S1, but say in S2. Also, assume
that equation 3 does not hold. It is possible then to have another equilibrium
in which (i) the type B uses a mixed strategy over nodes in S1 ∪S2, (ii) the
probability of acceptance of recommendations coming from nodes in S1 is
adjusted below one so as to ensure that the expected payoff from an implant
located in S1 is the same as that from an implant in S2.10 The freedom to
distribute some probability weight over nodes in S2 may now help in ensuring
existence of equilibrium. Instead of formally deriving a sufficient condition
for this type of equilibrium, we illustrate such an equilibrium in the example
below.
10However, the value of δ cannot be too high. If δ is high, then the low discounting may
induce the type B implant at some site in S1 to strategically postpone her recommendation
to a later period.
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Example 1. Let n = K(K + 1) where k > 3. Denote I = {i1, . . . , iK}, and
let each ik ∈ I be the hubs of K stars Γ1, . . . ,ΓK , each Γk having K + 1
peripheral sites. Finally, let site 1 be connected to each site in I, and to no
other site. Also, no site ik in I is connected to any site in the other stars.
So,
Γ = (
⋃
i∈I
Γi) ∪ {1i1, . . . , 1iK}
Figure 1 illustrates the graph for the case where K = 2.
We want to choose values of ρ and δ such that 1 is a member of D(Γ).
Then, d¯1 = K. But, notice that for each ik ∈ I, d¯ik = K + 1 since none of
the peripheral sites in Γik are connected to 1.
Suppose the type G firm places an implant at 1. Then, the expected
benefit from the implant will be
B1 = (1− ρ)δ [ξK(1 + δξK+1)]
where for any k
ξk =
k∑
i=1
(
k
i
)
i(1− ρ)iρk−i
On the other hand, if the type G firm places an implant at any of the sites
in {i1, . . . , iK}, then the expected payoff is
B2 = (1− ρ)δ [ξK+1 + (1− ρ) (1 + δξK−1(1 + δξK+1))]
Evaluating the two expressions at ρ = 0, it is easy to check that
B1 > B2 if δ >
2
K2 − 1
That is, if δ > 2
K2−1 , then 1 maximizes decay centrality for ρ = 0 and hence
for “small” values of ρ. Assume that ρ > 0 is such that B1 > B2. Also,
δ ∈ ( 2
K2 − 1 ,
ξK
ξK+1
)
Let
β¯1 =
(1− ρ)Kp(1− p¯)
p¯(1− p) , β¯i =
pρ(1− p¯)
p¯(1− p) for each i ∈ I,
Using equation 1, it is easy to verify that if α1 = 1, then for each i ∈ I∪{1},
η1k,i = p¯ if βi = β¯i. Suppose∑
i∈I
β¯i < 1, but
∑
i∈I
β¯i + β¯1 ≥ 1
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Notice that equation 3 is not satisfied. However, the pair of strategies (α, β)
along with response decisions specified below is an EDE.
Let
(i) α1 = 1,
(ii) βi = β¯i for each i ∈ I, β1 = 1−
∑
i∈I β¯i.
(iii) Each i ∈ I accepts recommendation from 1 with probability one in
period 1.
(iv) Each i ∈ Γik , i 6= ik accepts a recommendation from ik with probability
ΓK
ΓK+1
in period 1 and with probability 1 in period 2.
(v) Both types of implants make their recommendations in period 1.
To check that these constitute an equilibrium, first notice that the type
G firm has no incentive to deviate since (1) 1 maximizes decay centrality,
(2) the implant speaks immediately and the product diffuses throughout the
network in 2 periods in view of (iii) and (iv) above. Consider now the
type B implant. Her expected payoff from any site i ∈ I is ξK given the
acceptance probabilities of the peripheral sites in the star. This is also the
expected payoff from the implant at 1 since 1’s recommendation is accepted
with probability one. Also, note that since δ ≤ ξKξK+1 , the implant at i ∈ I has
no incentive to strategically postpone her recommendation to period 2, even
though her recommendation in this period would be accepted with probability
one. Finally, we check that the response decisions described in (iii) and (iv)
are optimal. To see this, note that the relevant agents in each case do not
expect any further information flows and so p¯ is the appropriate threshold
for acceptance.
If m ∈ S1 but is not critical, then there could be an equilibrium of the
following kind. The good product may diffuse throughout the network with
probability one even if some neighbors of m who do not constitute critical
links with m refuse m’s recommendations - the fact that some link mi is not
critical obviously implies that there is some path from m to i not involving
the link mi. An implication of this is that the type B firm needs fewer
customers in equilibrium. Now, suppose each node i ∈ S1 has one neighbor
in N¯i(Γ) with very high degree, say hi, while the others have relatively
low degree. Then, one option for the type B firm is to put probability
weights β˜i > β¯i on each i such that all nodes in N¯i(Γ) except hi accept
i’s recommendation. In other words, the freedom to dispense with hi as a
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customer helps to raise the probability that type B can put on each node i
in S1 and so it may be possible to support an EDE even when equation 3 is
not satisfied.
5 Comparative Statics
In this section, we discuss the role of different parameters and the network
structure in sustaining an EDE.
It is easy to check that an increase in p makes it more likely that an
EDE exists since it allows the type B firm to place more probability weight
on nodes and still satisfy the requirement that the updated beliefs reach the
threshold value of p¯. In other words, if an EDE exists for some value of p
and then p increases, there must continue to be an EDE. In what follows,
we focus on the role of the network structure and of ρ.
5.1 The Role of the Network Structure
We first show that no site i can be too well-connected if the network is to
sustain an EDE. In particular, no network that contains a star encompassing
all nodes can support an EDE.
Theorem 2. Suppose Γ contains a star as a subgraph. Then, Γ cannot
support an EDE.
Proof. Let M = {i ∈ N |di(Γ) = n− 1}. If Γ contains a star, this set is non-
empty. Then, all members of M maximize decay centrality. Let M ′ ⊂M be
the support of α. Take any site i /∈M ′. Then, d¯i = 0 since any site j 6= i is
connected to all sites in M ′. So, the support of β is contained in M ′. Take
any node i ∈M ′ such that βi ≥ αi. Then, it follows from equation 1 that
η1j,i ≤ p < p¯
So, no neighbor of the bad implant at i buys the product after receiving a
recommendation from i. Since the bad type is indifferent between all sites
in the support of β, no site in the support of β can get her recommendation
accepted. This implies that only the good type employs an implant. How-
ever, this cannot be an equilibrium since the bad type would then deviate
and place an implant at some site in M ′.
Remark 4. Note that Theorem 2 implies that the complete graph cannot
support an EDE!
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In some cases, we will make the following assumption.
Assumption S : There is a unique node m maximizing decay centrality.
Several network structures satisfy this assumption - for example, the line
when n is odd, or the star.
Under Assumption S, we can also place an upper bound on the degree
of m.
Theorem 3. Let Assumption S hold, with m the unique node maximizing
decay centrality in Γ. Then, if Γ is to support an EDE, dm ≤ n−12 .
Proof. Let Γ support an EDE, and let dm = k. Then, for all i 6= m,
d¯i ≤ n − k − 1. Suppose dm > d¯i for all i 6= m. Then the bad type
would prefer to put her implant at m since recommendations from m are
accepted with probability one. But, if βm = 1, then η1m,j = p < p¯ and
this is not consistent with m’s recommendations being accepted. Hence,
dm = k ≤ d¯i ≤ n− k − 1 for some i 6= m. This implies dm ≤ n−12 .
Theorems 2 and 3 describe some network structures which cannot sup-
port an EDE. In particular, nodes maximizing decay centrality cannot be
too well-connected since their connections tend to reduce the effective degree
of those nodes which are “close” to them. In an intuitive sense, it is also
clear that “larger” networks11 are more conducive to supporting EDE. The
next example shows that an asymmetric network where the site maximizing
decay centrality has low degree may actually facilitate efficient diffusion.
Example 2. Let n be odd and n ≥ 9. Choose any site, say 1, and divide
N \ {1} into two equally-sized disjoint subsets N1, N2. Let 2, 4 be in N1 and
3, 7 be in N2. The network is the following:
(i) 1 is connected to just 2, 3.
(ii) No connection between nodes in N1 and N2.
(iii) All nodes in N1 are connected to each other, except that 2, 4 are not
connected to each other.
(iv) All nodes in N2 are connected to each other, except that 3, 7 are not
connected to each other.12
The effective degree of all nodes i 6= m is n−52 , while that of m is 2. So,
n ≥ 9 ensures that the effective degree of i 6= m is at least as high as that of
m.
11A larger network would be one that has a greater number of nodes of maximal effective
degree, but keeping the node(s) that maximize decay centrality fixed. It is easy to define
this explicitly for regular trees.
12Figure 2 illustrates this graph for the case n = 9.
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Let α1 = 1, βi = 1/(n− 1) for all i 6= 1. Responses are as follows:
(i) Sites 2 and 3 only accept recommendations from 1.
(ii) Site 1 does not accept any recommendations.
(iii) All other sites accept recommendations from all other sites.
This will be an equilibrium if βi = 1/(n − 1) ensures that the posterior
probability is at least as large as p¯. Notice that p¯ is the appropriate threshold
for acceptance because the network structure ensures that no agent expects
any further information flows.
Our conjecture is that given all other parameters, if this network of size n
does not support an EDE, then no network of size n or smaller will support
one. This is because this network allows Firm B to distribute its probability
weight across n− 1 sites.
5.2 The Influence of Innovators
Recall that ρ is the probability of an innovator. Here, we discuss the role of
ρ on an EDE. In order to simplify the discussion, we assume throughout this
section that Assumption S is satisfied. Thus, the type G firm must be using
a pure strategy of placing her implant at m with probability one, where m
is the unique node in D(Γ).
Consider first the case where ρ = 0. This is a particularly stark case to
analyze, where the equilibria of the previous sections do not exist-specifically
only m can speak credibly in the first period. A bad implant at other sites
will have to wait to speak. For instance, a neighbor of m can speak in period
2 by pretending to have received a recommendation from m in period 1, a
site at a distance of 2 from m can speak in period 3 and so on.
The specific structure of the network will determine whether the good
product will diffuse throughout the network.
Theorem 4. Suppose ρ = 0, Assumption S is satisfied13 and the unique
node maximizing decay centrality is both critical and is in S1. Then, Γ
cannot support an EDE.
Proof. Let m be the unique node maximizing decay centrality. If an EDE
exists, αm = 1. Also, if m is critical, then all of m’s neighbors must accept
m’s recommendations. If some neighbor j does not accept m’s recommen-
dation with probability one, then the criticality of m implies that the good
product will not diffuse to some segment of the network. Since m ∈ S1, the
type B firm can get |S1| acceptances by putting an implant at m. Of course,
13This assumption can be relaxed but is maintained here for ease of exposition.
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βm = 1 is not possible since all neighbors of m would then not revise their
beliefs about the product. On the other hand, when ρ = 0, recommenda-
tions from no other site are credible initially. Hence, the expected payoff
to type B from an implant at i 6= m is strictly less than the payoff at m if
the recommendation from m were credible. This shows that the type B firm
does not have an equilibrium strategy.
This theorem of course immediately implies that when ρ = 0, the line or,
more generally, a tree where the node maximizing decay centrality also has
maximal effective degree cannot support an EDE. It is easy to construct ex-
amples of trees which support an EDE if m does not have maximal effective
degree. Consider the following example.
Example 3. Let n ≥ 9 and n be odd. Let Γ be as follows. Individual 1 has
just 2 links to 2 and 3. Divide the set {4, . . . , n} into two equal subsets, let
2 be connected to all individuals in the first subset, each of whom have no
other link. Similarly, let,individual 3 be connected to all agents in the second
subset, each of whom have no other link. Figure 1 illustrates the graph for
the case n = 9.
Assume that
δ ≥ max
(
4
n− 3 ,
n− 5
n− 3
)
First, notice that if type G places his implant at 1 and all subsequent
recommendations are accepted with probability one, then his payoff is 2δ +
(n− 3)δ2− c. On the other hand, if he places his implant at 2 or 3, then his
payoff is (((n− 3)/2) + 1)δ+ δ2 + ((n− 3)/2)δ3− c. The inequality δ ≥ n−5n−3
ensures that the first sum is at least as large.
Second, assume also that p and p¯ are such that the type B can put proba-
bility 1/2 on each of the nodes 2 and 3, and still make a credible recommen-
dation in period 1. That is, the neighbors of 2 and 3 have to infer whether
sites 2 and 3 have received a recommendation from the implant of type G
placed at 1 in the previous period or whether it is the type B implant who is
speaking in period 1, having strategically kept silent in period 0. A probability
weight of β2 = β3 = 1/2 brings their updated belief that the recommendation
is being passed on from 1 reach the threshold, given the initial parameter
values.
Then, the following is an EDE. The type G puts his implant at 1 with
probability 1, the type B randomizes between 2 and 3 with equal probability.
The type G implant speaks immediately while the type B implant speaks in
period 1. All recommendations are accepted with probability one.
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These constitute an equilibrium because if δ ≥ 4n−3 , then the type B
implant has no incentive to deviate and place his implant at 1 - he gets
δ2(n − 3)/2 − c in equilibrium, whereas he would get 2δ − c by placing his
implant at 1. The response decisions are optimal because updated beliefs are
not below the threshold.
How does a positive ρ impact on the possibility of efficient diffusion?
Fix all other parameters and the network structure Γ. Now, ρ influences
the nature of equilibrium in two ways. First, the higher the value of ρ, the
lower is the net gain from having an implant for both firm types. So, there
will be some value of ρ¯ such that if ρ ≥ ρ¯,then one or both types of firm F
will refrain from employing an implant.
Second, the value of ρ influences the updating process according to equa-
tion 1. Suppose ρ changes. How does this affect η1i,i−1 for a fixed value of βi
and distribution α? An increase in ρ makes it more likely that i−1 is an in-
novator, but also makes it less likely that none of the other neighbors of i are
innovators. These effects move in opposite directions and an unambiguous
answer is difficult to provide.
Suppose, however, that Assumption S holds, and an EDE exists where
type B’s equilibrium strategy places no probability weight on m, the unique
node maximizing decay centrality. Then, the trade-offs are somewhat easier
to discern.
In this case, the expression for η1i,j simplifies considerably for j 6= m and
becomes
η1i,j =
pρ(1− ρ)di−1
pρ(1− ρ)di−1 + (1− p)βi
Now,
sign
∂η1i,j
∂ρ
= sign
∂pρ(1− ρ)di−1
∂ρ
Hence,
∂η1i,j
∂ρ
≥ 0 iff (1− diρ) ≥ 0
So, if the initial value of ρ for which an equilibrium exists is “low”, then
an increase in ρ does not decrease η1i,j and so the same strategies continue
to be an equilibrium. On the other hand, an increase in ρ at higher values
decreases η1i,j and so the same strategy may not be an equilibrium. These
suggest that there is some threshold value of ρ above which equilibrium of
this type is not possible.
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6 Inefficient Equilibria
From the previous sections, it is clear that some network structures may
not support efficient diffusion equilibria. We examine the nature of the
equilibria in the absence of an EDE. We first discuss the general issues and
then illustrate them with an example, both in the case of a line with a unique
median (or node maximising decay centrality). Considerations for general
networks are similar but are difficult to see explicitly, whilst this is possible
in the case of a line.
Recall from Section 3 that
S = N \ {1, n,m− 1,m+ 1,m− 2,m+ 2}
is the set of sites which can possibly have two consumers, and that an EDE
may not be possible if S contains too few members for the type B firm to
distribute its probability weight for acceptance probabilities of 1 to be best
responses.
Possible ways out of this problem involve changing the equilibrium accep-
tance probabilities so that some or all nodes in {1, n,m−1,m+1,m−2,m+2}
on the line can be part of the support of β. We must consider the following,
however:
1. The equilibrium acceptance probabilities have to be indexed now by
time. Suppose some node i makes recommendations to nodes j in
period 1 and these are accepted with probabilities less than 1. Node
i, if it contains an implant from B, must not, in equilibrium, gain by
deviating to being silent in period 1 but speaking in period 2. Such
a deviation need not be known to be off the equilibrium path, since
i might be passing on recommendations he received and accepted the
preceding period. If an implant is supposed to speak in the first period
with probability one, a recommendation from that site in period 2 will
be accepted for sure. For players with two neighbours, the expected
payoff in equilibrium, without considering the cost of an implant or
a payoff from an innovator at the same site, must therefore be 2δ.
Thus the incentives for implants to delay speaking must be considered
seriously. (This is not an issue if all recommendations are accepted
with probability 1, since in that case an implant with two neighbours
would clearly do better speaking in the first period.) However, for each
node i, there is a maximal time iT at which he can speak credibly to
all his neighbours. After this time the probability of acceptance goes
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to zero for at least one neighbour. We discuss this last point in detail
later in this section.
2. The second major issue that arises with equilibrium acceptance prob-
abilities in (0, 1) is that they affect the updating of probabilities. Con-
sider n = 9, and an equilibrium where the G type implants at site 5
with probability 1 (as in the EDE). Take the case of individual 3, who
is not an innovator or an implant and who does not receive any rec-
ommendation from either neighbour in period 1. Suppose this player
3 gets a recommendation in period 2. The conditional probability
that the product is good given a recommendation from 2 depends on
(i) the value of ρ, the probability a good recommendation can origi-
nate in 1, and (ii) the probability that 2 accepts a recommendation
from 1. If the recommendation comes from 4 in period 2, the relevant
probabilities include the acceptance probability with which 4 accepts
5’s recommendation. If the acceptance probabilities are different, the
conditional probabilities for recommendations from left or right will
be different. The higher the acceptance probabilities, the more is not
receiving a recommendation “bad news” for Player 2. This means that
not receiving a recommendation from the right could be worse news
than not getting one from the left.
3. For small n and for given c, it might be optimal for both types to
locate at m. In this case, acceptance probabilities have to make the
bad type indifferent between entering and not entering and the good
type strictly prefer to enter. We do not discuss this further because
we consider the cost c to be relatively small so that both types will
find it optimal to enter.
We now discuss iT in more detail. Consider i ∈ S. Suppose i = 2, and
there is an implant at 2. Suppose this implant at 2 makes a recommendation
in period 2. Then, 3 can believe that site 1 is an innovator and has passed
on a positive recommendation in period 1, which is then passed on by 2 in
period 2. But, suppose 2 makes a recommendation in period 3. Then, 3
knows that 2 must be an implant who has not made a recommendation in
an earlier period.
In general, suppose i < m, and is at a distance of kl from 1 and kr
from m with kr < kl. Then, if i makes a recommendation in period t = kr,
then i+ 1 will know that conditional on the product being good, a positive
recommendation should have come from the right in no more kr−1 periods.
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Hence, for each i ∈ S, there is a time period iT up to which a bad implant
can make recommendations and still have a positive probability of getting
her recommendation accepted by both her neighbors. If the maximum time
period for a credible recommendation is different for tthe left and right
neighbour, we set iT to be the minimum of the two. Note that mT = 1.
For each i ∈ S, let sti denote the probability with which the implant at
i makes a recommendation in period t for 1 ≤ t ≤ iT . In equilibrium, the
implant mixes over the timing of the recommendation only if the sum of the
acceptance probabilities of his neighbors in period t − 1 equals δ times the
corresponding sum in period (t+ 1). If i speaks in period t,then the player
to i′s left assesses the probability that the product is good to be ηti−1,i and
the person to i′s right as ηti+1,i.The explicit expressions for these are compli-
cated because they have to take into account possibly different acceptance
probabilities along the way (from agents who received recommendations at
prior time periods from a possible innovator or good implant to i) depend-
ing on whether the assumed path to i is from i′s left or right. Using the
values of ηtj,i, where j is i
′s neighbour, is not an innovator and has received
no recommendation from any of her other neighbours up to this point, we
set each ηtj,i = p¯
t
j (if j is to randomise), where p¯
t
j is the value that makes j
indifferent between buying now or waiting.
We can similarly calculate iT for other nodes. Note that a reccommen-
dation is credible for both neighbours, if a site has two, if t ≤ iT , but it could
remain credible for one neighbour and not for the other for t > iT .
We now present an example which illustrates some of the features of an
inefficient equilibrium.
Let n = 9 and Γ be a line. Let δ ≥ 1/2, ρ = p = 1/2, and p¯ ≡ bb+g = 0.6.
The constructed equilibrium has the following features:
(i) α5 = 1.
(ii) β1 = β9 = 0, and all other βi > 0. The values are specified below.
(iii) The implant of the G-type firm “speaks” in period 1. The B-type
implant at nodes 3,4,5,6,7 also makes a recommendation immediately,
while the implants at nodes 2 and 8 randomize between speaking in
periods 1 and 2.
(iv) . Nodes 4 and 6 accept the recommendation from 5 with probability
1/2 in period 1. For i = 3, 4, the recommendation of i is accepted
with probability one by i − 1 in period 1. Similarly, for i = 6, 7, the
recommendation of i is accepted by i+ 1 in period 1.
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(v) Nodes 1 and 9 accept the recommendations of 2 and 8 respectively
with probability one in periods 1 and 2.
(vi) Nodes 3 and 7 reject the recommendations of 2 and 8 respectively with
probability one in period 1. They accept these recommendations with
probability γ = 1−δδ in period 2.
(vii) All other “credible” recommendations are accepted with probability
one. 14
We now provide some detailed calculations to show that these constitute
an equilibrium. First, note that
η145 = η
1
65 =
p(1− ρ)
p(1− ρ) + (1− p)β5
Also, the threshold values of 4 and 6 for accepting a recommendation from
5 must be p¯ = 0.6. Setting η145 = η
1
65 = p¯, we get
β¯5 = 0.333
Note that this value of β¯5 ensures that there cannot be an EDE in this
example. This is because if an EDE is to exist, all the probability mass of β
has to be placed on 2,5 and 8, but since β5 ≤ 1/3 and β2 < 1/3, β8 < 1/3,
the sum will be less than 1 and therefore an EDE is not possible.
Now,
η123 =
p(1− ρ)
p(1− ρ) + (1− p)β3
Moreover, 2 cannot hope to get any further information in later periods -
if 1 were an innovator and had to make a recommendation, she would have
done so in period 1 itself. So, 2’s threshold probability value for acceptance
after receiving a recommendation from 3 is p¯. Equating p¯ = η123, we get
β¯3 = .166
For exactly similar reasons, we get
β¯7 = .166
14A “credible recommendation is the following. Any recommendation in period t ≤ iT
is credible for both neighbours of i ∈ S. However, a recommendation from 2 in period 4
is credible for 1(since 2 may be passing on a recommendation originating from 5, but not
credible for 3.
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We now calculate the threshold probability value for which 3 is indifferent
between accepting and rejecting a recommendation received solely from 4
in period 1. Denote this as p¯134. If 3 accepts this recommendation at this
value, then his expected utility is p¯134(b+ g)− b. But, 3 could postpone his
decision to purchase by one more period in the hope of receiving another
recommendation from 2 next period.15 Since 2 accepts 1 ’s recommendation
with probability one, the probability of receiving such a recommendation
equals p¯134ρ, and so the expected utility from waiting is p¯
1
34ρδg.
16 Hence,
p¯134 =
b
b+ g − δρg =
3
5− δ
Since
η134 =
p(1− ρ)
p(1− ρ) + (1− p)β4
the value of β4 which makes 3 indifferent between accepting and rejecting 4
’s recommendation is
β¯4 =
0.5− 0.25δ
3
Similarly,
β¯6 =
0.5− 0.25δ
3
We now calculate β¯2 and β¯8. Let s1i , s
2
i be the probabilities with which
i = 2, 8 make recommendations over periods 1 and 2. We first calculate
p¯132, the threshold probability which makes 3 indifferent between accepting
and rejecting 2’s recommendation in period 2. If 3 waits one period, then
she may receive another recommendation from 4 (who would be passing
on the recommendation from 5). Since 4 accepts 5’s recommendation with
probability 1/2, the probability that 3 receives a recommendation from 4 in
period is 1/2p¯134. Equating expected utilities, we get p¯
1
32 =
3
5−δ .
17 Hence,
β¯2s
1
2 =
0.5− 0.25δ
3
15Conditional on receiving a recommendation from 4 in period 1, a second recommen-
dation from 2 in period 2 must imply that 2 is passing on a recommendation from 1 since
2 cannot be either a bad implant or an innovator.
16We can check that if there is no recommendation from 2, the probability of G drops
to 3
7−δ , which is less than p.
17Here again, no recommendation from 4 is sufficiently bad news that 2 then does not
buy. The conditional probability of G is again 3
7−δ .
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In period 2, the threshold probability value of acceptance for 3 must be
p¯ since she cannot get any further recommendations. Using this, routine
calculation yields
β¯2s
2
2 = 0.021
Adding, and using the fact that s12 + s
2
2 = 1, we get
β¯2 ∈ [0.10, 0.145] for δ ∈ [1/2, 1]
Similarly
β¯8 ∈ [0.10, 0.145] for δ ∈ [1/2, 1]
Hence, for all values of δ ≥ 1/2, ∑
i 6=1,9
β¯i > 1
Now, for any value of δ ≥ 1/2, choose the probability distribution β such
that
β2 = β8 = β¯2, βi < β¯ifor i = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, β1 = β9 = 0
Also, choose s1i , s
2
i for i = 2, 8 so that η
1
32 = p¯
1
32, η
2
32 = p¯, η
1
78 = p¯
1
78,
η278 = p¯
2
78. Clearly, these can be done given the choice of β¯i.
We first check that the actions specified for both the G-type and B-
type implant are optimal. Note that for each i 6= 1, 9, the sum of the
acceptance probabilities equals 1 if i ∈ S, while exactly one neighbour of
i /∈ S accepts the recommendation with probability one. Also, for i = 2, 8,
the expected payoffs are equal in periods 1 and 2. It is easy to check that
these ensure that the B-type has no profitable deviation. Similarly, the G-
type is also maximizing expected payoff by placing his implant at the median
with probability one.
The relevant probability weights βi and s1i , s
2
i (for i = 2, 8) have been
chosen so that except for nodes 1 and 9, all other nodes receiving credi-
ble recommendations are indifferent between accepting and rejecting rec-
ommendations. Hence, their stipulated responses are optimal. Of course,
p¯112 == p¯
1
98p¯ since neither 1 nor 9 can expect to get any other recommen-
dation. This ensures that 1 and 9 have to accept the recommendations of 2
and 8 with probability one in period 1.
Suppose now that δ < 1/2. Then, the foregoing is not an equilibrium
because 2 and 8 have no incentive to make a recommendation in period
2. For instance, even if both 1 and 3 accept 2’s recommendation in period
2 with probability one, the (gross) expected payoff is still less thn 1 - the
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expected payoff from recommending in period 1. However, it is easy to
check that the following modification to the preceding specification is an
equilibrium
(i) The B-type implant at nodes 2 and 8 set s1i = 1. That is, they
recommend with probability 1 in period 1.
(ii) Set β2 = β8 = 0.5−0.25δ3 . This ensures that 3 and 7 are indifferent
between accepting and rejecting first-period proposals from 2 and 8 respec-
tively. They both reject with probability one, while 1 and 9 accept with
probability one.
(iii) Set βm = β¯m = 1/3.
(iv) Set βi < β¯i for i = 3, 4, 5, 6.
(v) Other response decisions are the same as before.
Notice that this specification would not be an equilibrium when δ > 1/2
because 2 (or 8) would then have an incentive to deviate by postponing a
recommendaton to period 2. This would be accepted with probability 1 by
both neighbours, hence giving an expected utility of 2δ > 1.
7 Extensions
We consider some possible extensions of the basic model.
7.1 Negative recommendations
We have assumed that “recommendations” can only be positive. The in-
tuition motivating this is that a neighbour can observe someone using the
product over some period of time; if the product has been tried and found
unacceptable, it will be discarded. To consider the chicken sausage exam-
ple, someone who dislikes the particular brand will not use it at pot luck
parties with her neighbours, unless she is acting as an implant for the firm
selling the product. Also, individuals may not want to admit that they have
been “duped” into buying a bad product, and so may not pass on negative
information.
However, one needs to consider negative recommendations as well if only
to consider the robustness of the model. It is easy to check that theorems
2 and 3 continue to remain valid. Theorem 4 will remain valid for regular
networks such as the circle.
It also turns out that the possibility of negative recommendations will
actually simplify calculations in one respect in that the probability calcu-
lations would not now depend on the potential recipient’s degree. So, the
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analogue of equation 1 will now be
η1i,i−1 =
p
[
αi−1 + (1−
∑
j∈Ni αj − αi)ρ
]
p
[
αi−1 + (1−
∑
j∈Ni αj − αi)ρ
]
+ (1− p)βi−1
(4)
However, it would complicate expected payoff calculations for B, where
a high degree recipient of an implant’s (positive) recommendation would
be more likely to have countervailing negative information than one of low
degree. Such a problem would not arise for regular graphs, but the general
issue is illustrated below.
So, suppose B places implants at i and j with some positive probability.
Then, his expected payoff from i is
Ei =
∑
k∈N¯i
(1− ρ)dk−1Pk
where Pk is the probability with which the offer is accepted by k. The
updated belief for all k ∈ N¯i(Γ) will now be the same - it will just depend
on βi and not on the degrees of k.
So, since Ei = Ej , we need∑
k∈N¯j
(1− ρ)dk−1Pk =
∑
k∈N¯i
(1− ρ)dk−1Pk
The specification of a general sufficient condition is now more difficult be-
cause the derivation of the support of β is now more complicated. However,
the qualitative result that a larger network is more conducive for efficient
diffusion remains unchanged for the line and regular networks.
The possibility of negative recommendations may also help in sustaining
efficient diffusion, particularly in dense networks where nodes have high
degree. This is because the expected payoff of the type B firm will now be
lower- and it will be lower the larger are the degrees of different sites that
can be recipients of implant recommendations. So, the type B firm may
simply not employ implants.
7.2 Multiple implants
If the firm can choose multiple implants, the qualitative features of the
analysis will be similar. Clearly it does not make sense for the multiple
implants to have overlapping supports (for the firm’s randomised strategies).
This suggests that for large networks, the firm will partition the networks in
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such a way as to have one implant randomly located (for B) in each element
of the partition. If δ is close to 1 and an EDE exists as above, there is
very little incentive for G to incur the cost of an additional implant, since
this can only speed up the diffusion and the benefit from this might be low
compared to the cost. Therefore, for low discounting, we would expect to
have several B implants but only one G implant. This suggests that the B
implants would either have to rely on a relatively high ρ for credibility or
speak only at sufficiently late time periods for the message from a supposed
good implant to have reached the particular site concerned.
7.3 The bad type’s probability of producing a good product.
We have assumed so far that Firm F knows its type, where type is identified
with the quality of the product that is produced. Let us redefine type as
follows. The type G firm produces a good product with probability one,
while type B produces a good product with small positive probability  and
the bad product with probability 1−. Suppose as before that firm F knows
its type in the modified sense.18
In this case, the following cases could arise (this is not an exhaustive
description):
(i) There is a unique node m maximizing decay centrality, which also
maximizes degree centrality. In this case, an EDE will not exist. The reason
is that both G and B will care about speed of diffusion, though B will care
less, and therefore both will prefer to locate at m rather than at any other
node. As pointed out earlier, both types locating with probability 1 at m
cannot be an equilibrium.
(ii) There is a unique node m maximizing decay centrality but it does not
maximize effective degree centrality. Now B will be better off not locating
at m for ε small enough. If he locates at a site that has effective degree at
least 1 more than m, he can get some additional payoff. If he locates at m,
he loses at least 1 for sure and obtains some additional payoff depending
on ε and δ. For  small enough, this is not a best response for B. In this
case, the analysis from the firm’s point of view will not change from that
discussed earlier in this paper. Hence, an EDE will exist under the same
conditions as before.
18Alternatively, suppose type is identified with quality of the product as before, but
consumers who buy the bad quality product make a “mistake” with small probability -
they make a positive recommendation with probability .
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8 Conclusions
Our motivation was to explore some of the implications of viral marketing
within a social network. Consumers are aware that firms may “seed” the
network, and also know that both “good” and “bad” quality firms may take
recourse to this form of advertising. In the presence of imperfect information
regarding the quality of a specific product, consumers cannot take recom-
mendations from their social neighbours at face value - the credibility of
recommendations is at stake. A crucial ingredient of our analysis is that
customers are rational, and update beliefs using Bayes Rule. Within this
framework, we show that a priori notions about what network structure is
conducive to efficient diffusion may be misleading. In particular, “small”
networks and highly-connected agents may actually deter the diffusion of
the good product.
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